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Purpose: This research investigates whether energy-efficient green buildings tend to provide net 
lease structures over gross lease ones.   It then considers whether owners benefit by trading away 
operational savings in a net lease structure.   
 
Design: Empirical models of office leasing transactions in Sydney, Australia, with wider 
transferability supported by analysis of office rent data in the United States. 
 
Findings: Labelled green buildings are approximately four to five times more likely than non-
labelled buildings to use a net lease structure.  However, despite receiving operational savings, 
tenants in net leases pay higher total occupancy costs, benefiting owners. On average, the 
increase in total occupancy costs paid by tenants in a net lease is equal to or greater than savings 
attributed to an eco-labelled building. 
 
Implications: A full accounting of total occupancy costs in eco-labelled buildings suggests that 
net lease structures provide numerous benefits to owners that offset the loss of trading away 
operational savings.  
 
Originality/Value:  The principal-agent market inefficiency, or “split incentive”, is a widely 
cited barrier to private investment in energy-efficient building technology. Here, a uniquely 
broad look at rental cash flows suggests its role as a barrier is exaggerated.  
 
Keywords: Commercial Real Estate, Energy Efficiency, Green Buildings, Real Estate 




Private benefits associated with energy efficiency – utility cost savings – create a theoretical 
market incentive for greenhouse gas mitigation, a public good. Yet, there is a literature that 
observes contradiction between uptake and expected profitability of energy efficiency 
investments (Kok et al. 2011). Exploration of the observed investment gap often arrives at a 
convincing principal-agent market failure narrative called the “split incentive” or “landlord-
tenant dilemma”: while building owners must fund capital asset upgrades, their occupants benefit 
from the operational efficiencies created by those investments (Heinzle et al. 2013; Janda et al. 
2016; Schleich and Gruber 2008).   
 
In response, complex schemes have been implemented to influence managerial decisions and 
“fix” the split incentive problem. Environmental upgrade financing1, whereby repayments of 
capital improvement loans are added to property tax collections (Van der Heijden, 2017), is an 
attempt to directly alter financial incentives. Environmental upgrade financing offers a potential 
solution because property taxes are paid by whichever party – landlord or tenant – takes on 
liability for paying operational expenses, thereby matching costs and benefits.  Other solutions 
seek to influence corporate governance. For example, Janda et al. (2016) find increased use of 
“green” lease clauses – negotiated environmental or social performance obligations – in an 
Australian and United Kingdom context, though very few of their model clauses involved legal 
liability or dispute resolution in the event of a breach.   
 
But are these interventions necessary? In theory, total occupancy costs should be at equilibrium 
as tenants trade increased rent for their own operational savings (Mooradian and Yang, 2002). 
Importantly, we observe that current discourse above on the split incentive theory is limited to 
analysis of direct cash flows. However, little broader property market perspectives exist in the 
literature beyond an initial estimate by Eichholtz et al. (2010) that operational cost savings may 
be fully capitalized in rent. Two recent studies suggest building owners are not concerned with 
trading away savings to tenants. Christensen et al. (2018) found that institutional owners 
strategically focus on energy savings, implying meaningful incentives to eco-label investments 
beyond operational savings.  Brotman (2016) implies that collective tenant demand for energy 
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efficiency motivates medical office owners, who always use triple net leasing, to invest in energy 
upgrades in competitive markets.  
 
We pose two questions to establish the salience of the split-incentive-as-barrier theory. First, 
since a gross lease structure is the simplest means to eliminate a split incentive, do owners 
disproportionally agree to gross lease structures to capture the savings from targeted investment 
in operational efficiencies? Second, when net lease structures are used in energy-efficient 
buildings, can it be quantified how energy savings affect the gross income received by the 
owner?2  To answer these questions, we study lease transactions in markets with substantial 
identification of eco-certified, energy efficient, buildings and choice in lease structure.      
 
The findings present compelling evidence that the split incentive is not a significant barrier to 
private investment in environmental building upgrades. Where markets offer diversity in lease 
structures, energy-efficient building owners are significantly more likely to enter into net lease 
arrangements, granting tenants subsequent operational benefits. However, landlords are 
indirectly compensated without the need for environmental upgrade financing. Besides the 
traditional role of a net lease in removing cost risk for the owner, we find that tenants offset the 
small operational savings from energy efficiency with higher total costs of occupancy. For a 
well-managed building, the overall outcome of trading away operational energy savings can be 
higher net income. 
 
II. Background & Hypotheses  
At a fundamental level, there are two primary financial incentives that attract private investors 
into the market for eco-labelled property investment: capital value security (i.e. lower 
obsolescence risk) and operational expense savings. Capital value benefits accrue exclusively to 
owners. However, lease negotiations determine which party benefits from operational expense 




i. Commercial Lease Structures 
Lease contracts create windows for insight into commercial real estate markets, cycles and 
participant behavior (Clapham and Gunnelin 2003; Ibanez and Pennington-Cross 2013; Wheaton 
1987).  Worldwide, leases can be classified along a spectrum from “gross” to “net”, based on the 
liability for operational charges over the term. The gross lease classification assigns the risk and 
responsibility of operational costs to the landlord; tenants only pay a fixed base rent as written in 
the contract. Net leases assign the tenant a lower base rent and liability to pay its share of future 
operational expenses. Economic theory suggests that landlords should extract the same value 
from a property regardless of lease structure (Ambrose et al. 2002; Booth and Walsh 2001; 
Grenadier 1996).  However, despite these expectations, there is limited qualitative or empirical 
support to this theory (Bond et al. 2008).  
 
Considering only risk shedding in an efficient market, tenants prefer gross leases as they reduce 
operational cost inflation risk while landlords prefer net leases for the same reason (Wiley et al. 
2014). Theory on lease market equilibriums (Grenadier 2005; Mooradian and Yang, 2002) 
supported with recent empirical work by Wiley (2014) suggests that heterogeneity in operating 
expenses provides a scenario where gross leases can be more profitable for a building owner. 
Notably, owners with relatively low operating expenses can benefit when offering the gross lease 
contract.  One of the key conditions for this argument to hold is that the “gross lease markup” – 
the additional base rent that a tenant pays for the landlord to assume liability for operating 
expenses (Wiley et al. 2014) – is determined by the market. The result, Mooradian and Yang 
(2002) argue, is that landlords with lower-than-average costs should offer gross leases so as to 
capture surplus from a market equilibrium gross rent.   
 
One potential reason why a landlord may choose not to use a gross lease when theoretically 
advantageous is an adverse selection problem (Benjamin et al. 1992).  Tenants that heavily 
consume operational services and use office space intensively are more likely to select gross 
leases as they privately know their use expectations (Chinloy and Maribojoc 1998). Accordingly, 
the literature confirms that landlords will not willingly offer a gross lease without symmetric 




ii. Sustainable Commercial Real Estate  
While the societal purpose of eco-labels in real estate is to signal natural resource conservation 
or reduced environmental pollution, both public goods, there is a literature arguing owners can 
be privately rewarded for capital invested (Ciochetti and McGowan 2010; Eichholtz et al. 2010; 
Fuerst and McAllister 2011; Pivo and Fisher 2010). Research identifies a range of attributes 
associated with capital value preservation associated with eco-labels: less risk of regulatory 
obsolescence, lower expense volatility and lower cost of capital – all of which manifest in 
increased appraisal and sale values (Christensen, 2018; Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001; Wiley et al. 
2010).  Some of this valuation increase may be due to the unique locational and physical 
attributes of these buildings (Ott and Hahn, 2018). 
 
Theoretical expense savings are generated from expected operational efficiencies (Eichholtz et 
al. 2010; Pivo and Fisher 2010). Lease structure determines who benefits from these savings by 
allocating responsibility for operational charges, modifying private incentives for green building 
investment. Under the net lease, the landlord would appear to have little direct incentive to invest 
in technology that facilitates more efficient operation if the primary returns are operational 
savings accruing to the tenant. Likewise, tenants in a gross lease may not earn benefits from 
operating in their space more efficiently (Pivo 2010). As introduced earlier, researchers speculate 
that use of a net lease could serve as a deterrent to future sustainability technology-related 
investment by other building owners (Bordass 2000; Heinzle et al. 2013; Vernon and Meier 
2012).  
 
Eco-labelled building owners and occupants also receive reputational benefits associated with 
social responsibility (Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001). Owner and tenant commitment to Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) also has the potential to influence lease transactions (Hebb et al. 
2010). Notably, CSR can moderate the effect of adverse selection. Public commitment to 
ecological consciousness and social responsibility can act as a signal of low resource 
consumption intentions by tenants. Therefore, CSR committed landlords and tenants would seek 
7 
 
lease structures that reward them for their CSR behavior. In this case, CSR-seeking tenants may 
prefer net leases while CSR-seeking investors prefer gross leases (Robinson et al. 2016; Simons 
et al. 2014).  
 
Empirical studies complicate these theoretical expectations. For example, not all CSR oriented 
tenants behave the same way and not all businesses operationalize CSR values the same way (Ho 
et al. 2012). Also, heterogeneity among eco-labelled buildings creates mixed expectations about 
building performance; not all eco-labels reliably indicate operational resource efficiency at the 
building level (Oates and Sullivan 2012; Scofield 2009), though aggregated research has found 
eco-labels to be associated with reduced operational costs relative to non-labelled competitors on 
average (Newsham et al. 2009). Finally, tenants do not appear to deviate from market rents when 
leasing space in a green-labelled building (Gabe and Rehm, 2014), suggesting that the occupancy 
benefits of green labelled space – CSR & operational expense savings – are not of significant 
private value.  
 
iii. Research Questions & Hypotheses 
We suggest study into the relationship between eco-labels and lease structure can resolve the 
apparent contradictions between theory and empirical evidence on tenant demand for labelled 
space, leading to a test of the split-incentive theory.  One hypothesis following from the split-
incentive theory is that a gross lease eliminates this problem, thus there is investor sorting based 
on lease structure:   
 
H1. Eco-labelled properties are more likely to offer gross leases. 
 
However, an equally tenable alternative hypothesis grounded in leasing theory recognizes that 
operational savings potential could be offset by adverse tenant selection. Thus, an owner may see 





H1a. Eco-labelled properties are more likely to offer net leases. 
 
Simply deciding on which competing hypothesis is supported empirically will be insufficient to 
resolve who benefits from the particular lease structure. Notably, tenants could be paying lower 
expenses in a net lease, but if their savings are capitalized into a higher rental rate the occupant 
may not be better off. Some early evidence that this may be the case comes from Eichholtz et al. 
(2010), who argue empirically that eco-labeled building rent premiums are of similar magnitude 
to reduced energy costs.  
 
To go deeper, we next evaluate the total costs of occupancy for each lease and test for a 
relationship between total occupancy costs and lease structure.  Again, two tenable and 
conflicting hypotheses exist: 
 
H2:  Tenants pay lower total costs of occupancy in eco-labelled buildings.  
H2a: Tenants pay the same (or higher) total costs of occupancy in eco-labelled buildings. 
 
According to Grenadier (1995), lease structure should have nil effect as the total costs of 
occupancy are what is traded in a competitive market equilibrium between the supply of space 
and demand for its use. If so, then all else equal – including risk profiles – landlords should be 
able to capitalize any operational savings (H2a) as argued by Eichholtz et al. (2010). However, 
the literature on split incentives associated with investment in eco-labeled building renovations 
makes an implicit assumption that H2 is true because the landlord is assumed not to benefit from 
her capital investment.  
 
 
III. Data & Method 
To test these competing hypotheses, we begin with data on urban office leasing transactions in 
Australia where there is a near binary mix of gross and net lease structures. Logistic regression 
models are used to describe the association between lease structure (net or gross) and lease 
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transaction attributes. Mixed effects regression techniques are then employed to investigate the 
effect of lease structure on the total costs of occupancy. Further robustness tests are conducted, 
including a test for transferability using lease transactions in the United States. 
 
i. Leasing Data - Australia  
Information on Australian office leasing markets is obtained for the central Sydney market, 
Australia’s largest and most competitive market for office space. In Sydney, a net lease is 
identical to the “triple net” (NNN) lease, where tenants are required to pay for property taxes, 
common-area utilities/maintenance (CAM) and property insurance. An Australian gross lease is 
identical to a “full service gross” (FSG) lease in the first year of the contract, but, important for 
this study, tenants are subsequently liable for property tax, CAM and insurance increases relative 
to that base year. This arrangement, often referred to as a “base stop”, is a useful structure for 
real estate research because there is nil expense risk traded in the contract negotiation as tenants 
will always take on this risk in both net and gross structures. Another benefit of the Sydney 
market is that there are no other lease structures observed in regard to operating expense sharing. 
  
The Sydney sample contains 880 office lease contracts registered between January 2009 and July 
2011 on a land title with the New South Wales (NSW) Department of Land and Property 
Information. Initial face rent (A$/m2/year), tenancy floor area (m2), lease structure (NNN or 
Gross), first year operating expense estimations (available for NNN contracts only), 
commencement date, term length (excluding options to renew),3 lowest floor of the tenancy and 
building address were extracted from each contract. For later robustness tests, security deposit 
amounts, commencement incentives, leasing broker, and tenant industry classification were 
established from the contract when available. After excluding non-market transactions, records 
with missing data, and repeat observations, 673 lease transactions remain. All lease dealings 
were conducted between January 2007 and July 2011 in 102 unique commercial office buildings.  
 
The RP Data Cityscope database for central Sydney is used to obtain leasable floor area (m2), 
number of unique tenants in the entire building and asset age at time of lease. Quality audits are 
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conducted by the Property Council of Australia (2006) and this study includes Premium, A- and 
B-grade buildings as defined in the 2010 audit of Sydney buildings. The Property Council of 
Australia has also defined key submarkets within Sydney’s central business district; all buildings 
fall into four of these submarkets (City Core, Western Corridor, Midtown, and Southern). 
Finally, access to public transport is calculated for this study as the walking distance to the 
nearest train station.  
 
Operational energy efficiency is measured by the presence of an eco-label. In Australia, an 
analogous eco-label to Energy Star, a US eco-label common in green building research, is the 
presence of a four-star or greater National Australian Built Environment Rating System 
(NABERS) Energy rating. The method behind a NABERS Energy rating is an annual site energy 
consumption audit, mandatory in the event of a lease or sale of large office buildings. Ratings 
range from zero to six stars, in half-star increments, with 2.5 stars representing the market 
average at the commencement of the scheme in 1999. It is generally accepted that a rating of four 
stars or above is “best practice”, as this threshold is specified in federal and state guidelines that 
encourage, but do not mandate, government tenants to seek accommodation in four star or higher 
properties.  Around 25% of all buildings obtain a 4-star or greater rating, so this threshold is also 
reasonably analogous to the top-quartile requirement for Energy Star certification in the US.  
 
Australia also has a more holistic eco-labelling system called Green Star designed primarily for 




To achieve comparability between NNN and gross contract rents,4 all observed NNN contract 
rents are converted to total costs of occupancy by adding all first-year operating charges, 
included in a gross contract.5 The formula for total occupancy costs (TOC) on a NNN lease is as 














The contract rent on a gross lease is taken as the grossed-up rent, with no addition of operating 
charges since the tenant does not pay any additional occupancy costs. Estimated building 
expenses as reported by the lessor in the lease contract are used to gross up NNN leases.  
 
As the lease transactions observed in Sydney span a five-year period, a rental market index is 
used to inflate each observation as an equivalent rent for the 2nd half of 2011 to ensure that rents 
observed across a number of years are directly comparable. The market index used is the 
coefficients for fixed time effects as reported in Gabe and Rehm (2014). 
 
Table 1 describes the dataset by lease type. Of interest is an observation that NNN leases tend to 
have higher total costs of occupancy and be offered in newer assets, while the incidence of an 
energy efficiency eco-label appears to bias towards NNN leases. Further investigation seeks to 
isolate the probabilities of lease structure given these exogenous effects 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
i. Probability of Lease Structure 
To explore the probability of a particular lease type while controlling for other exogenous 
effects, a fixed effects logistic regression model is estimated: 6 
 
NET = β0 + β1 EcoLabel + β2 Building + β3 Lease + β4 Geo + ε     (2) 
 
Where: 
• NET equals one if an observed lease transaction is a net lease contract. 
• EcoLabel is a binary variable indicating the presence of an eco-label.  
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• Building is a vector describing the building in which a lease transaction occurs. 
• Lease is a vector describing the terms of a lease contract. 
• Geo is a classification vector that groups each observation by submarket. 
• ε  is residual stochastic error. 
Exploration of the Sydney data reveals that lease structure is not related to the year a contract 
was signed, so there is no need to complicate the model with time controls.  
 
The variable of interest in Equation 2 is the binary attribute that identifies eco-labelled buildings, 
which equals one if the building has obtained a four-star or higher NABERS Energy rating. As 
specified, if H1 is true, the eco-label coefficient will be negative, meaning that owners of 
operationally efficient buildings are more likely to offer a gross lease. If H1a is true, then the 
eco-label coefficient will be positive, indicating a higher probability of a net lease contract 
associated with eco-labels. If there is no relationship between lease structure and eco-labels, the 
eco-label coefficients will be statistically indifferent to zero.  
 
It is possible to further explore the Sydney data as a robustness check to test whether other 
factors that could influence lease structure decisions are instrumented by the eco-label variable. 
For example, some owners (occupiers) may strategically position themselves as owners 
(occupiers) of eco-labeled real estate and prefer a particular lease structure; excluding 
identification of the owner (occupier) would result in the lease structure preference appearing in 
the eco-label parameter. Further model estimations control for the owner’s leasing broker (often 
the institutional owner itself), the tenant’s business sector, and the security deposit required.  
 
ii. Total Costs of Occupancy 
To test for the effect of lease structure on overall rental market outcomes, three models are tested 
using a linear mixed-effects specification. We examine associations between building 




             𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) = 𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚 + 𝜹𝜹𝟏𝟏(𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳) + 𝜹𝜹𝟐𝟐(𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩) + 𝜀𝜀𝑤𝑤,𝑏𝑏                 (3) 
 
TOC is the total cost of occupancy for each lease transaction in the database as calculated in 
Equation 1. Parameters δ are estimated from observed lease transactions, 𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚 is a floating 
intercept representing random effects for each submarket (Geo) and 𝜀𝜀𝑤𝑤,𝑏𝑏 is stochastic error 
containing both within- and between-market effect errors. Rent distributions have a long right 
tail, so in accordance with other hedonic models of office lease transactions (Fuerst et al. 2013; 
Gabe and Rehm 2014), the natural log of the dependent variable is used. The variable of interest 
here is the lease characteristic associated with lease structure – NNN or gross.  
 
However, as seen in Exhibit 2, NNN leases are not randomly distributed in the data, opening up 
the parameter of interest to possible selection bias. To mitigate selection bias, Specification 3 
introduces propensity weighting based on the likelihood a lease uses a net structure. The logistic 
regression model (Equation 2) estimates the probability that a lease is structured as a net lease, 
ρ(NNN = 1|EcoLabel, Lease, Building, Geo). In Specification 3, each rental observation is 
weighted by the inverse of the probability of having the lease structure observed; all NNN leases 
are weighted by ρ(NNN=1)-1 while all FSG leases are weighted by 1- ρ(NNN=1)-1.  
 
For a subsample where data on leasing incentives is complete (n=340 of 673), we run robustness 
checks to establish whether accounting for tenancy improvement allowances or rent-free periods 
alter the findings. Specifications 4 and 5 are identical to Specifications 2 and 3, but the 
dependent variable is changed to the natural log of the annuitized lease value, which takes into 
consideration both incentives and future rent escalation clauses.  
 
iii. Transferability  
Lease structure decisions can vary by market. To investigate whether our results apply to other 
markets, we run the models specified in Equations 2 and 3 on lease transactions from selected 
markets in the United States. Leasing data used here comes from Robinson et al. (2017), which 




Market selection is based on the context most relevant to our study: a market where occupants 
have a binary choice between NNN and gross lease structures. Many markets in the US 
disqualify because one structure (typically FSG or NNN) dominates, leaving investors with no 
strategic decision in the matter. Other US markets like Dallas disqualify with many “modified 
gross” leases featuring bespoke arrangements for expense sharing, details of which are not 
available in our US dataset. Based on the data in Robinson et al. (2017), only San Francisco Bay 
Area, Seattle and Minneapolis/St. Paul feature leasing markets similar to Sydney, so leasing 
transactions in these three markets are used to test whether the Sydney findings based on the 
models above replicate in similar markets overseas.  
 
V. Results  
We find that energy efficiency eco-labels are significantly associated with net lease structures. 
While tenants usually benefit from the operational savings offered by energy efficient space, we 
further find that their overall total costs of occupancy stay the same or increase.  
 
i. Lease Structure 
Table 2 contains four estimations of Equation 2 with data obtained from lease transactions in 
Sydney. Control variable parameters suggest an association between high value buildings and the 
use of a net lease instrument. Based on the fourth, and most complete, specification, a one dollar 
(per m2) increase in total occupancy costs is significantly associated with a 1.7% increase in the 
odds of using a net lease, assuming all else remains constant. However, this high-rent-net-lease 
pairing is mitigated by other controls: higher-floor tenancies and premium buildings (both of 
which would be associated with higher rents) are more likely to offer gross leases. 
 
Another control is the unsurprising negative relationship between number of tenants in a building 
and probability of a net lease. There is a significant association between having five or fewer 
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tenants and the likelihood of agreeing to a net lease; the probability a net lease is used increases 
by a factor of 2000 in a building with five or fewer tenants.7 As the number of tenants in a 
building increase, the transaction costs of managing expense accounts for each tenant increase, 
so it is unsurprising that the probability of using a gross lease is positively associated with 
number of tenancies.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In regards to the variable of interest, there is a consistent signal indicating a higher probability 
that an eco-labelled building owner will agree to a net lease contract with tenants. In terms of the 
hypotheses presented earlier, there is strong support for H1a, which states that eco-labelled 
buildings are more likely to offer net leases. Eco-labelled building owners in Sydney are 
approximately five times as likely to enter into a net lease agreement if all control variables in 
the model are held constant.  Specifications 3 and 4 demonstrate that the probability of using a 
net lease in an eco-labeled building increases when owner and tenant preferences for lease 
structure are included in the model.  
 
ii. Total Occupancy Costs 
With increased probability of agreeing to a net lease, tenants in energy efficient buildings are 
more likely to benefit from reduced operating costs, confirming that split incentives may be a 
concern for efficient investment. But this is only the direct effect. How does a net lease 
arrangement affect their total costs of occupancy? Table 3 presents the estimations of rent 
models exploring the effect of a net lease structure and eco-labels on total occupancy costs.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Control variables in these models conform to traditional expectations. Higher floors in an office 
building cost more to occupy, with an approximately 1% increase in total occupancy costs per 
story. Total occupancy costs increase the closer an occupant is to a train station. A-Class 
buildings experience a premium relative to B-Class or lower buildings and buildings graded 
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“Premium” by the Property Council of Australia cost 23-27% more to occupy relative to the 
benchmark A-Grade properties. In the propensity weighted specification (Model 3), control for 
the tendency of new buildings to offer net rents shows that buildings cost less to occupy as they 
age.  
 
When a building is leased using a net lease structure, Sydney tenants pay approximately 7% 
more in total occupancy costs after controlling for the propensity of net leased buildings to be of 
higher quality than gross leased buildings. The magnitude of this cost increase far outweighs the 
weak and generally not significant 1 to 2% discount in total occupancy costs associated with 
leasing space in an eco-labeled property.  
 
The subsample of leases where annuitized lease values can be calculated confirms these findings 
hold after controlling for tenant incentives. For this subsample, overall consideration paid during 
a lease is approximately 12% higher in a net lease8 while overall operational savings gained via 
choosing an eco-labeled building is only 5%. Overall, the Australian models suggest an 
approximate 5 to 7% increase in total occupancy costs (which is potential gross revenue for the 
owner) on average in an eco-labeled building. Since operating cost inflation risk is always borne 
by the tenant in Australia, no matter the lease structure, this outcome represents a risk-neutral 
trade. 
 
iii. Transferability  
In the selected US markets, Table 4 suggests tenants in Energy Star-labelled properties are 
approximately four times more likely to agree on a net lease arrangement than tenants in a non-
labelled building. This finding is remarkably similar to that observed in Sydney. The type of eco-
label does not appear to matter in the US dataset; US tenants in LEED-labelled assets (a design 
specification that includes more than just energy efficiency) are also four times more likely than 




Similarity with Sydney also emerges in the US model of total occupancy costs. Propensity 
weighted results in Table 5 show net lease premiums of approximately 20%. While the 
coefficient magnitude appears to be capturing effects above and beyond purely net lease 
structure, the directional support of the Sydney findings is strong. Interestingly, in the US, the 
eco-label discount on total occupancy costs (20-22%) almost exactly offsets the increase 
associated with a net lease structure, meaning that the average net lease tenant in an Energy Star 
or LEED building is paying roughly the same total costs of occupancy as they would in a non-
eco labelled, gross-leased building.  
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
VI. Discussion  
There is significant association between net lease structures and operationally efficient eco-
labelled buildings in open markets where lease structures vary. However, buildings with net 
lease structures are also associated with higher total occupancy costs on average, thus eco-labels 
may be a useful strategy to extract higher gross income out of tenants. Despite the appearance of 
a split incentive limiting investment in building energy efficiency, landlords indirectly benefit 
from investing in operational efficiencies that are passed on to tenants.  
 
This research strengthens the recent work of Brotman (2016) and the early observation of 
Eichholtz et al. (2010) that landlords are able to capitalize energy savings into higher net rental 
income; we find this holds no matter who receives the direct savings. Logistic models in both the 
Australia and US can be interpreted that the offer of operational savings may make a tenant more 
amenable to enter into a net lease agreement, suggesting Brotman’s case study of medical offices 
is transferrable across markets and sectors. Far from being a disincentive to investment in 
upgrades needed for an eco-label, the sharing of operational expense savings with tenants in a 
risk-neutral trade comes with either increased (Australia) or unaffected (US) gross income 




Although this study is not able to measure investor return directly as we do not have data on the 
cost of energy upgrades, landlords investing in eco-labels are likely to be receiving an even 
higher risk-adjusted return, all else equal (including lease structure), by reducing risk. While 
Sydney lease structures do not trade future expense risk, past studies of eco-labelled buildings 
agree that sustainable real estate investment is associated with lower obsolescence risk (Eicholtz 
et al. 2010; Pivo and Fisher 2010), which reduces capitalisation rates (the amount the capital 
markets are willing to pay for a building’s future cash flow). The split incentive literature solely 
considers operational cash flows and does not factor in decreased capitalization rates from 
reduced obsolescence risk. Furthermore, net lease structures reduce adverse selection risk, so an 
investment that increases the probability of tenants agreeing to a net lease would theoretically 
reduce capitalisation rates. 
 
Reverse causation is also a possibility for our finding: net-leased buildings could be more likely 
to be eco-labelled. In particular, owners seeking to maintain performance-based labels such as 
Energy Star or NABERS Energy must be re-audited regularly as these are not awarded on static 
design potential, but measured outcomes that can vary as a result of occupant & management 
decisions. Heavy energy consumption by tenants lacking the incentive to pay in full could result 
in failure to qualify for an eco-label. The net lease provides a natural incentive for a tenant to 
operate efficiently, eliminating the need for additional “green lease” clauses (Bright and Dixie 
2014) that seek to regulate tenant behavior in order to maintain eco-label certifications.  
 
A perplexing question remains, why might tenants be willing to pay more for in total occupancy 
costs than they receive in financial benefits? CSR benefits are one possible explanation because a 
net lease allows tenants to benefit directly from CSR behavior. As such, CSR tenants are able to 
communicate their corporate values and measure the value of their strategy through operational 
savings.  
 
Another possible explanation is that owners may be using an eco-label to exploit information 
asymmetry. Just as tenants have private information on expectations of their use intensity – 
creating the adverse selection problem – the reverse could occur with net leases. Owners have 
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private knowledge of their operational costs, so owners with higher relative costs have an 
incentive to seek a net lease. Eco-labels only audit a small fraction of total operating expenses so 
the label theoretically could be used to mask inefficiencies in non-evaluated aspects of building 
operation – such as insurance, management fees or taxes – and entice tenants to sign a net lease. 
Some suggestive evidence of this theory appears in Reichardt (2014), who found surprising 
overall operating expense premiums in Energy Star-labelled buildings. Further research into the 
causality of why net leases are associated with higher total costs of occupancy on average should 
explore the role of information asymmetry.  
 
 
VII. Caveats and Limitations  
While this study offers important new insights into the relationship between eco-labels and lease 
structures for office markets with lease structure heterogeneity, there are some limitations that 
open additional avenues for further research. Notably, these data represent market outcomes at 
the lease transaction scale and do not allow comment on the owner’s investment decision-
making process or the owner’s total investment return, which would need to be measured at the 
building scale.  
 
Most importantly, our findings are derived from markets with relatively binary net/gross lease 
structure offerings and thus are not applicable in markets where culture or an exogenous factor 
not studied has a significant role in determining lease structure. Likewise, further investigation of 
markets with high incidence of bespoke modified gross structures will be necessary to establish 
relationships between specific operational expenses and lease structure. In addition, most 
properties studied are investment-grade commercial real estate, so the conclusions here are likely 





Using lease transaction data, this paper examines the complexity of who benefits from 
operational efficiency in commercial office buildings. There is a consistent association between 
the presence of an eco-label and the probability of a net lease structure observed in selected 
Australian and US markets. Further exploration associates net lease structures with higher total 
costs of occupancy relative to a statistically equivalent property using a gross lease. The 
magnitude of this cost premium for tenants offsets any savings traded to tenants. With tenants 
more likely to agree to net lease arrangements, landlords also benefit from reduced risk of 
adversely selecting resource-intensive tenants if CSR motivates efficient tenants to seek eco-
labeled space.  
 
Despite the attractive logic of the split incentive as a barrier to private investment in eco-label 
upgrades, deeper exploration reveals that landlords benefit indirectly when trading away 
operational savings to tenants. While further qualitative research is needed to explain exactly 
why tenants may choose to pay higher overall costs to lease on net terms, this study is promising 
to real estate managers, investors, and urban policymakers concerned about the split incentive 
problem as a barrier to investment in energy saving building upgrades. Expanding beyond simple 
direct incidence, our research provides evidence that an owner’s total income or risk exposure 
can be positively influenced by trading away operational savings.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Sydney Lease Transaction Data.  Energy Eco-Label indicates presence of four-
star or higher NABERS Energy certification. †Indicates a dummy variable with 1 representing presence of variable. 
 
 
Gross  NNN  
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
TOC per sqm $629 $135 $810 $221 
Lease Area (sqm) 699 1,625 1,149 1,979 
Lease Term (yr.) 4.57 1.96 5.25 2.29 
Floor Level of Tenancy 12.38 10.68 18.57 12.04 
Bldg. Area (sqm) 21,352 17,915 35,133 16,292 
Bldg. Age (yr.) 36.69 17.85 25.78 11.79 
Bldg. Height (floors) 25.76 13.89 35.58 12.59 
Energy Eco-Label† 0.15 0.36 0.33 0.47 
CBD† 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Dist. to Transit (km) 0.20 0.12 0.21 0.08 






Table 2. Sydney Logistic Models. Results of logistic regressions on the likelihood of the lease being NNN. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively. Standard error in brackets. 
 
Effect 1 2 3 4 
Eco-label (1=NABERS ≥4) 1.077*** (0.268) 1.089*** (0.270) 1.483*** (0.334) 1.660*** (0.352) 
TOC (2011 dollars) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.002) 
Tenancy area (log.) 0.008 (0.128) 0.059 (0.177) -0.042 (0.196) 0.106 (0.207) 
Building area (log.) 0.109 (0.477) 0.068 (0.488) -0.525 (0.614) -0.475 (0.638) 
Lease term (months) 0.006 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) 0.005 (0.007) 
Building age (log.) -2.732 (2.359) -2.765 (2.363) -4.801 (3.288) -4.499 (3.440) 
[Building age (log.)]2 0.277 (0.356) 0.282 (0.356) 0.581 (0.487) 0.534 (0.512) 
Number of building floors 0.054** (0.021) 0.055** (0.022) 0.102*** (0.027) 0.096*** (0.027) 
5 or less tenants (1=yes) 5.151*** (1.768) 5.278*** (1.821) 7.365*** (2.068) 7.735*** (2.124) 
Tenancy floor level -0.108*** (0.020) -0.110*** (0.020) -0.113*** (0.022) -0.121*** (0.023) 
Distance to train (log.) 0.790*** (0.157) 0.787*** (0.157) 1.097*** (0.203) 1.030*** (0.200) 
Premium grade building (1=yes) -1.847** (0.742) -1.880** (0.746) -3.001*** (0.897) -3.509*** (0.954) 
A-grade building (1=yes) -0.451 (0.329) -0.466 (0.331) -0.596 (0.403) -0.510 (0.409) 
B-grade building (1=yes) Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Intercept  -11.300** (5.212) -11.125** (5.245) -4.680 (6.405) -6.628 (6.698) 
Submarket Fixed Effects (3)  Included Included Included Included 
Security Deposit %  -1.361 (3.282) -3.486 (3.781) -5.328 (3.670) 
Leasing Broker Dummies (15)   Included Included 
Tenant Sector Dummies (12)    Included 
Tjur’s D 0.493 0.493 0.562 0.586  
AIC 569.3 571.2 525.8 526.8 





Table 3. Australia Total Costs of Occupancy Regressions.  The dependent variable is the natural log of total 
occupancy costs for each lease.  All regressions are mixed effect regressions with submarkets controlled by random 
effects.  Model 1 reports results excluding lease structure.  Model 2 incorporates Net lease structure.  Model 3 uses 
propensity weights on the likelihood of a net structure. Models 4 and 5 are identical to Models 3 and 4 but use 
Annuitized Lease Value as the dependent variable to account for incentives and rent escalation structures. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable Ln(TOC) Ln(TOC) Ln(TOC) Ln(ALV) Ln(ALV) 
NNN Lease  0.088
***    
(0.009) 






Eco-Label -0.013     (0.011) 
-0.026**    
(0.010) 






Short-Term Lease (<5 yr.) -0.005     (0.010) 
-0.012     
(0.009) 






Long-Term Lease (>5 yr.) -0.009     (0.012) 
-0.020*     
(0.011) 






Tenancy Floor (story) 0.012
***   
(0.001) 
0.012***    
(0.001) 






Tenancy Floor squared -0.000
***  
(0.000) 








Tenancy Area (sqm) -0.008
*     
(0.004) 
-0.006     
(0.004) 






Distance to Train (log) -0.007     (0.005) 
-0.014***  
(0.005) 







***   
(0.016) 
0.246***   
(0.015) 




























Building Age (years) -0.001     (0.001) 








Building Age squared 0.000      (0.000) 
0.000      
(0.000) 







***   
(0.076) 
6.235***   
(0.080) 






Random Submarket Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Propensity Weighted No No Yes No Yes 
AIC -928 -1001 -998 -291 -281 
BIC -820 -889 -885 -195 -186 





Table 4.  US Logistic Model of Lease Structure. Dependent variable = 1 if lease is net lease. Selected U.S. 
markets include Minneapolis, San Francisco and Seattle; intra-market differences are are controlled by fixed effects. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively. 
 
Effect Estimate Std. Err. 
Intercept -7.086 7.893 
Energy Star eco-label (1=yes) 1.359*** 0.339 
LEED eco-label (1=yes) 1.386*** 0.370 
Total occupancy costs (log.) 4.292*** 0.380 
Tenancy area (log.) 0.257*** 0.088 
Building area (log.) -0.952*** 0.353 
Lease term -0.023 0.020 
Building age (log.) 4.437*** 1.651 
[Building age (log.)]2 -0.659** 0.258 
Number of building floors -0.513*** 0.044 
5 or less tenants (1=yes) 3.375*** 0.422 
Renovated lobby (1=yes) 7.169*** 0.574 
Retail tenant (1=yes) 0.305 0.520 
Tenancy floor level -0.011 0.018 
Annual occupancy rate -0.015 0.010 
Located in CBD (1=yes) 9.803*** 0.783 
Distance to transit 0.159*** 0.017 
Class A (1=yes) -1.091 5.793 
Class B (1=yes) -2.672 5.774 
Class C (1=yes) Reference Reference 
Market Fixed Effects Included  
Generalised Chi-Square 253.47  





Table 5. US Total Costs of Occupancy Regressions:  This table reports results of regressions on the natural log of 
total occupancy costs for selected US markets.  Model 1 reports results excluding lease structure.  Model 2 
incorporates net (NNN) lease structure variable.  Model 3 uses propensity weights on the likelihood of a NNN 
structure. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels respectively. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 
NNN Lease  0.320***  (11.691) 0.190***  (6.357) 
Eco-Label -0.180*** (-4.791) -0.190*** (-5.573) -0.222*** (-7.311) 
Tenancy Area (log. SF) 0.012       (1.158) 0.012      (1.296) 0.013      (1.531) 
Building Size (log. SF) -0.230*** (-7.035) -0.159*** (-5.258) -0.144*** (-5.094) 
Lease Term (months) 0.001      (0.279) 0.002      (0.972) 0.001      (0.221) 
Building age (log.) -0.403**   (-2.440) -0.647*** (-4.272) -0.520*** (-3.447) 
[Building age (log.)]2 0.068***  (2.700) 0.103***  (4.500) 0.084***  (3.762) 
Number of building floors 
(log.) 0.100***  (3.619) 0.149***  (5.859) 0.110***  (3.986) 
Renovated Lobby 0.013      (0.381) -0.085*** (-2.586) -0.035     (-1.137) 
CBD  0.323***   (8.298) 0.105***   (2.624) 0.196***  (4.841) 
B-Class or lower grade -0.229*** (-5.377) -0.123*** (-3.087) -0.122*** (-3.288) 
Access to Transit 0.215***   (3.523) 0.194***  (3.496) 0.111**   (2.039) 
Annual Occupancy Rate 0.006***  (5.809) 0.004***  (4.334) 0.005***  (5.697) 
Retail 0.254***  (4.041) 0.272***  (4.764) 0.288***  (5.372) 
Tenancy Floor (story) 0.010***  (4.131) 0.011***  (5.278) 0.010***  (4.988) 
Intercept 5.752***  (11.204) 5.199***  (10.651) 4.859***  (10.483) 
Random MSA Effects Included Included Included 
Propensity Weighted No No Yes 
AIC 399 281 235 
BIC 395 277 231 









1 Examples include the Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programme in the United States and 
Environmental Upgrade Agreements (EUA) in major Australian cities. 
2 Total gross potential income is considered to be the same as total costs of occupancy in this study. Indirect 
ancillary incomes (parking, on-site vending, etc.) are ignored, so our findings may not be applicable in rare cases 
where energy efficiency initiatives significantly affect ancillary incomes.  
3 Every contract with a tenant’s right for a further term includes a clause adjusting the contract rent to an appraised 
market rent at the commencement of any further term. This means that the value of a further term as a call option 
has nil value since it could never be exercised at below-market rates. Nevertheless, specifications including option 
terms were tested, with no impact on any outcomes.  
4 The “contract rent” is the payment made by the tenant as specified in the lease contract. Without the adjustment 
performed here, gross leases will always have higher contract rents relative to net leases because a gross lease 
includes a markup to compensate the landlord for accepting payment liability for operating expenses (Wiley et al., 
2014).  
5 An alternative approach would be to compute net operating income (NOI) for each lease. We have chosen to use 
total costs of occupancy to describe benefits to both occupant and owner. There is also an asymmetry in the Sydney 
lease data; net leases have operating expense data but gross leases do not. Separate modelling specifications using 
estimated NOI as the dependent were run for both markets, with no change in the results reported here.  
6 The authors have also run mixed linear effects models (where submarkets are specified as random intercepts and 
the error term contains between- and within-market errors) with practically identical results. The decision was taken 
to present the fixed effects model here owing to its relative ease of interpretation.  
7 Caution is advised when interpreting the magnitude of this odds ratio (e7.775 = 2287). By convention, there will 
always be a dearth of lease transactions in buildings with few tenants, so it is a difficult relationship to model. In 
Sydney, there are only 12 (out of 673) lease transactions in buildings with five or fewer tenants, so the statistical 
power of this estimate is low. Raising the cutoff for a “low tenant” building gradually erodes the high odds ratio (of 
a net lease).   
8 Besides it being a subsample, one quirky reason for the increase from 7 to 12% in total costs to the tenant with the 
switch to ALV is specific to Sydney (and Australian markets in general). Incentives are typically calculated as a % 
of the base rent due over the term and can be spent as improvement allowances or rent discounts. Since gross leases 
include base year opex in the base rent, gross lease tenants receive higher nominal value incentives at the same 
incentive percentage.  
                                                 
